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Introduction 
 
Human reasoning processes are necessarily based on some stimulus or infor-
mation that enters human’s cognition. Based on the given stimulus or the given 
information, they predict, for instance, what will come next, infer what has 
happened, and decide their course of action in the future. In this respect, it is not 
surprising that languages are equipped with functional devices which encode the 
experiencer’s perception of the stimulus and human’s active reasoning processes 
based on them. Such functional devices are evidentiality (EV, henceforth) and 
epistemic modality (EM, henceforth).  
Chafe (1986) narrowly defines EV to be a linguistic device that indicates in-
formation source via which the origo obtains information in question. EM gener-
ally refers to a linguistic device that marks the speaker’s commitment for validity 
of what the speaker believes to be true with regard to information in question. In 
spite of the seemingly transparent definitions of the two functional categories, the 
relationship between the two categories has been the target of a heated debate for 
decades and it still seems to be an ongoing issue: a debate on whether or not EVs 
and EMs should be conflated. For those who claim that the two categories are 
conflated (this paper names them ‘conflationists’) have seen EVs as means for 
qualifying the validity of a proposition (Boas 1911, Chafe and Nichols 1986, 
Palmer 1986, Willett 1988), whereas for ‘non-conflationists,’ they have argued 
that EV must be distinguished from EM (Aikhenvald 2004, De Haan 1999, 2001, 
Michael 2010).  
Each of the approaches has their own strength: Conflationists’ claim is sup-
ported by evidence that EM readings are usually conveyed by utterances that 
contain EVs in some languages; Non-conflationists’ claim is also supported by 
evidence that EM reading is not necessarily encoded semantically by EVs in other 
languages. And it has been generally assumed that if one of the two approaches is 
taken, it will contradict and undermine the other.  
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This paper claims, as a third view, that it is not a matter of separability of 
the two functional categories, but a matter of which portion of the causal 
event structure, which embeds both of the categories, is profiled and becomes 
salient in the construal. That is, one schematic causal structure can account for 
the wide range of EV and EM semantics, assuming that specific forms and 
languages can differ in referring to different part of this schematic structure. In 
order to provide motivated accounts of the interdependence of EVs and EMs as a 
conceptual ‘package,’ this study looks into schematic structure of causality, EV, 
and EM via force dynamics accounts (Sweetser 1990) in depth.  
Section 1 overviews the debate between conflationists and non-conflationists 
and the previous accounts of conceptual structure of epistemic modals, which will 
be a stepping stone for the discussion of the conceptual interdependence of EVs 
and EMs. In the following section, I argue that the causal structure underlying 
Sweetser’s accounts of EMs needs investigating further in depth, in order to 
accommodate both EVs and EMs in the causal structure. In section 3, based on 
the specified overall picture of EVs and EMs, this paper proposes a third view 
that we should consider the whole causal event structure in order to better grasp 
the interdependence, providing conceptual schematic model for EVs and EMs.  
 
1  Background  
 
This section explores two major issues before proposing another view on the 
debate: 1) the nature of the debate between conflationists and non-conflationists 
and 2) the previous accounts of conceptual structure of EMs (Sweetser 1990). The 
goal of this section is first, to show that both approaches are not fully satisfactory 
in that the debate is being made without agreement on whether EVs contribute 
meaning at the propositional level or the illocutionary force level (Speas 2008: 
941) and in that the nature of the debate is solely due to the artificial and theoreti-
cal assumption that semantics and pragmatics should be separated (Section 1.1). 
Second, this section also aims to show that EVs and EMs need to be viewed in a 
broad conceptual picture (in a causal event structure), which has not been dis-
cussed thoroughly in the previous accounts (Section 1.2).  
 
1.1  Conflationists vs. Non-conflationists 
 
1.1.1  Conflationists 
To begin with, the main claim of conflationists is that whatever the semantics of 
EV may be, their communicative purposes are epistemic in nature (Atkinson 2004. 
Chafe and Nichols 1986, Fox 2001, Ifantidou 2001, Kärkkäinen 2003, Palmer 
1986, Sakita 2002, Willett 1988; see Michael 2010). The close link between EV 
and EM is also hinted in Dendale and Tasmowski’s (2002) statement, 
“[R]eferences to sources of information have been linked closely to attitudes 
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about the epistemic status of information, because the linguistic markers encoding 
these two semantic domains are often the same.” If an EV marker semantically 
encodes direct source of information, for instance, it is natural that the infor-
mation conveyed by the utterance is more reliable than the one semantically 
encoded by an indirect EV. In short, EV naturally triggers the origo’s reasoning 
process, leads the speaker’s process of reasoning from the available premises to 
his or her conclusion, and eventually qualifies the utterance to be related more or 
less to EM functionally.  
The Korean firsthand EV marker -te- makes a supporting example for the 
claim: when the marker is used, both EV and EM are semantically encoded and 
pragmatically indefeasible (Kwon 2009). The marker semantically encodes that 
information that is talked about is directly witnessed or experienced by the 
speaker:  
 
(1)* chelswu-ka     kong-ul    cha-te-la,  kulentey  
Chelswu-Nom  ball-Acc kick-te-ending but  
 chelswu-lul  po-ci-mos-ha-ess-ta 
 Chelswu-Acc  see-Conn-Neg-do-Ant-Decl.ending 
 *“(I directly experienced that) Chelswu kicked the ball, but I didn’t see 
C.” 
 
Since the EV semantically encodes the firsthand source of information, we can 
see that the inference is indefeasible, considering that (1) is contradictory. In 
addition, the marker also indicates that the speaker is sure about the conveyed 
information:  
 
(2)* amato  chelswu-ka kong-ul  cha-te-la 
 Probably Chelswu-Nom ball-Acc kick-te-ending 
 “*(I directly experienced that) Probably, Chelswu kicked a ball.” 
 
Since the focal event has been fully vouched by the speaker, a weak epistemic 
modal adverbial amato ‘probably’ is incompatible. Therefore, the Korean case is 
a supporting evidence for the conflationist approach, since both EV and EM 
semantics are semantically coded by the single morpheme. It shows that in some 
language, there is no need to separate one category from the other and thus, we 
can infer that the boundary between the two functional categories is far from 
being clear-cut.  
Moreover, the fact that EVs and EMs in languages are reported to functionally 
overlap with each other cross-linguistically is another supporting generalization 
for conflationists, because cross-linguistic functional overlap indicates that the 
two categories are conceptually contiguous. In fact, the functional overlap is 
witnessed by more than a few linguists in various languages (Tibetan (Garrett 
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2001), Quechua (Faller 2002), St’át’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2006) inter alia). 
Thus, conflationists argue that the coupling of EVs and EMs is conceptually 
natural and unmarked.  
The conflationist’s argument is, however, vulnerable to the claim that ‘to talk 
about inseparability of the two categories already takes an assumption that there 
exist two separate categories.’ The next sub-section discusses the counterargu-
ment in detail.  
 
1.1.2  Non-Conflationists 
 
In section 1.1.1, we have seen that EVs and EMs are conceptually close to each 
other and that one of them naturally gives rise to sense of the other. However, 
there are some other languages where only one of the two is encoded and the 
other is pragmatically implicated. So to speak, some languages do not have the 
functional overlap necessarily. For instance, Michael (2010) argues that EVs and 
EMs should not be treated as a single conflated category, since the seemingly 
plausible overlap might not work in some language. His evidence is found in 
Nanti quotative: the EM evidenced by quotatives in Nanti is defeasible pragmatic 
implicature and thus, they can have the opposite effect of increasing responsibility, 
not necessarily diminishing (Michael 2010):  
 
(3) Ari nokaNti. 
  ari no= kaNt -i 
  truly 1S=  say -REAL.I 
  ‘Indeed I say.’ 
 
Although indirect EVs in general are likely to indicate that information of the 
focal event is less reliable than direct EVs (because the speaker obtains the 
information indirectly, i.e., via  someone else’s hearsay), some languages 
employ a quotative with the speaker’s increased responsibility for the reliability 
of a proposition as shown in (3). In this respect, non-conflationists claim that EV 
does not principally play the role of a pragmatic proxy for EM in communicative 
interaction (Aikhenvald 2004, Davis et al. 2007, DeHaan 1999, 2001, DeLancey 
1986, Fasola 2007, Hardman 1986, Lazard 2001, Michael 2010, Plungian 2001). 
According to them, EV only asserts the presence of evidence, but not evaluates it 
in any way; EM is evaluative in nature and based on the evaluation assigns a 
confidence measure to the speaker’s utterance, but it does not necessarily encode 
the source (De Haan 2001). EV just encodes primarily the type of information 
source, and speaker certainty is either made explicit with a modal expression or 
determined pragmatically from what is known about that source (Speas 2008: 
952). 
   The critical cue for this claim is, first of all, whether pragmatic implicature 
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involved in usages of EV is defeasible or not. Since there exists a case where only 
one of the categories (EV) is semantically encoded, EV and EM do not belong to 
the same functional category. Even the Korean case where EV and EM are both 
semantically encoded by a single morpheme is not a problem to them. That is 
because it is merely a language-specific case where two functional categories 
used to exist separately, and are grammatically united as such.  
Secondly, they argue that the fact that EVs and EMs often have different his-
torical origins in languages supports the claim (De Haan 1999). They stipulated 
that EM is simply one of the potential sources of EV, which involve deixis, 
tense/aspect systems, not to mention perception and mirativity (De Haan 2001). 
Since a diachronic connection between EM and the possible functional ranges is 
not necessary, they concluded that EVs and EMs do not have to belong to a single 
functional category. Thirdly, they claim that co-occurrence of EV and EM in 
some languages shows that they are not members of the same paradigmatic 
category. 
   The non-conflationist’s claim is still, however, open to some conceptual 
challenges. Although it is true that the increased responsibility of quotative EV is 
normally unexpected, it involves more or less the speaker’s assessment of the 
situation, which can still be regarded as EM. What Michael’s Nanti example 
shows is that the EM semantics of the utterance relies on which pronominal 
reference is utilized, rather than that the quotative’s EM sense is cancellable. If 
the source is the speaker herself, an utterance that contains the quotative marker 
will naturally qualify its strong epistemic stance. The motivation of the increased 
responsibility lies with the subjectivity with regard to the usages of the first 
person pronominal reference, rather than with the separability of the categories.  
Moreover, the conflationist’s historical claim is not impregnable. With regard 
to De Haan’s claim that EM is only one of the possible routes via which EV can 
develop, other potential ranges such as deixis, tense, aspect, perception etc. 
actually involves EM sense more or less. When deictic elements, linguistic tense 
and aspect properties are coded, the speaker’s (epistemic) evaluation will definite-
ly be involved more or less. If it is the case, it would not be easy to argue that EVs 
are totally discrete from EMs. The third claim regarding the co-occurrence of EV 
and EM is not conclusive evidence as well for a distinct class of EVs, when 
considering that some languages allow multiple modals (Speas 2008: 951).  
 
1.1.3  Implications 
 
Both conflationists and non-conflationists do not seem to make impregnable 
arguments. To conflationists, although it is true that EVs and EMs are united, it is 
not easy to deny that their concepts do exist separately, before they form a single 
grammatical category. To non-conflationists, although it is plausible that either of 
EMs or EVs are not necessarily encoded or implicated in languages, it is an 
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irresistible fact that EVs and EMs interact very closely and thus, that their func-
tions overlap cross-linguistically. These unsettled definitions of EVs and EMs can 
be hinted by Speas’ (2008:953-954) characterization of the two categories.  
 
Whether Evidentials ‘are epistemic modals’ depends on how the modal base is related to 
classification as a modal. If dependence on a modal base entails that an item is a modal, 
then Evidentials seem to be modals. However, if modals are more narrowly defined as 
items whose interpretation involves quantification over worlds (or situations), Evidentials 
do not seem to qualify (Speas 2008:953-954). 
 
Notice that the participants in the debate take it for granted that there exists a 
clear-cut boundary between semantics (encodability) and pragmatics (implicature). 
The reason why the debate has been spinning the wheel might be that the debate 
stems from the theoretical assumption of the artificial demarcation of the two 
functional categories. When focusing only on defeasibility of a certain function, 
which is a theoretically loaded way, we might not be able to capture the nature of 
each category appropriately. This artificial distinction will face a problem to 
analyze the following data in Imbabura Quechua (Kwon 2010):  
 
  (4)a. Juan shamu-rka-mi 
 Juan come-Perf-mi 
  ‘Juan came.’ 
 
b. nyuka mama-mi wacha-ri-rka Seoul-pi.  
  my mother-mi born-Ref-Perf Seoul-Loc 
  ‘My mother was born in Seoul.’ 
 
-Mi in Imbabura Quechua is called a direct EV or validator (EM). It is interesting, 
however, that (4a) is vague in that it can mean either that the speaker witnessed 
the focal event (Juan came, I saw; direct EV) or that Juan told the speaker that he 
ran (Juan came, I heard from him; EM). In addition, (4b) is uttered, when the 
speaker was told from her grandfather that her mother was born Seoul. On the 
surface, it is a marker of inconsistence: the enclitic functions either as a direct EV, 
a strong EM, or an indirect EV. Faller (2003) draws a conclusion from the similar 
data that -mi should be defined as the best possible evidential marker. The best 
possible evidence is not always direct visual evidence and ‘EV licensing condi-
tion’ flexibly licenses EM and/or EV functions of the marker upon context.  
   With the naïve semantic/pragmatic distinction, it does not seem to handle the 
Imbabura Quechua case, because the characteristic of the marker cannot be 
defined either without the speaker’s optimal assessment or without the speaker’s 
direct experience. In this respect, this paper assumes that what matters should be 
how the utterance is construed, not what the utterance encodes and/or implicates. 
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So to speak, in order to characterize EVs and EMs, it will be crucial to consider 
how the experiential origo experiences, evaluates, and reasons within a conceptu-
ally serial causal structure. 
This paper argues that in order to grasp EVs and EMs, we need to consider the 
overall causal event structure where semantics of EV and EM arises, instead of 
employing a theoretical cue of semantic encoding and pragmatic implicature. In 
fact, EVs and EMs are construed within the series of causal event structure: the 
speaker’s event perception, the speaker’s recounting event, and the speaker’s 
reasoning process. What makes EVs or EMs relies on which portion of the causal 
structure is profiled and coded by linguistic construction. Since the two categories 
belong to a single causal structure, what the linguistic cues of EV and EM signal 
overlap with each other, and either of the categories will give rise to the other 
sense. Hence, to define either of the categories is not to be done independently of 
the other. In addition, by considering them as overlapping regions of a single 
causal structure, the fuzzy categories in Quechua can be handled. Based on this 
reasoning, now let us take a look at the causal event structure in detail. 
 
1.2  Deontic Modals vs. Epistemic Modals 
 
The causal event structure has received much attention by various linguists 
(Talmy 1981, 1988, Sweetser 1990 inter alias). Especially, the schematic causal 
structure of EM (and EV, implicitly) in English has been accounted for by Sweet-
ser (1990) by means of Talmy’s force dynamics approach (1981, 1988). I will 
argue that source of information implicitly takes part in the event structure and 
thus, that we need to analyze the event structure of EM in a more fine-grained 
sense so that we can account for the implicit EV function in the structure.  
Originally, Sweetser (1990:50) observes that EMs are metaphorical extension 
of root-modal meanings, thanks to our tendency to use the language of the exter-
nal world to apply to the internal mental world. Furthermore, the metaphorical 
extension of EMs can be schematized in terms of force and barriers (Talmy 1981, 
1988). Examples of weak epistemic modal may can be exemplified as follows: 
 
(4) John may go. 
“John is not barred by (my or some other) authority from going.” 
 
(5) John may be there.  
“I am not barred by my premises from the conclusion that he is there.” 
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force
barrier
 
Figure 1. FD-Schema of May 
 
As explained in (4) and (5), a physical trajector (John in (4)) or a mental trajector 
(the origo’s reasoning in (5)) is not constrained by social authority in (4) or the 
given context in (5), which can be schematized as shown in Figure 1. The physi-
cal or conceptual trajector is represented to be a force vector in the figure, where-
as the social authority or the physical/conceptual constraint to be a barrier. The 
interaction between the two frame elements determines the strength of EMs. In 
the similar vein, examples of must can be shown as follows:  
 
(6) You must come home by ten. (Mom said so.) 
“The direct force (of Mom’s authority) compels you to come home by 
ten.” 
 
(7) You must have been home last night.  
“The available (direct) evidence compels me to the conclusion that you 
were home.” 
 
Notice that in example of EM (7), the direct evidence forces the speaker to 
conclude that the addressee was home just as the direct force makes the speaker to 
come home by ten in (6). In other words, the direct force that compels the origo to 
conclude as such stems from the origo’s direct perception of evidence. It becomes 
clearer that EMs involve the origo’s direct perception of evidence, when we 
consider (8):   
 
(8)  (looks at nametag) “You must be Seth Sweetser’s sister” (Sweetser 1990: 
57). 
 
The evidence, a nametag, which is perceived directly by the speaker, causes the 
speaker to reason about the addressee’s identity and to make an utterance such as 
(8). In this respect, a force vector in Sweetser’s schematic picture needs to be 
broken down into smaller frame elements such as evidence, the origo’s perception, 
the origo’s reasoning, and the origo’s inference.  
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2  Force Revisited: Evidentiality Embedded in Epistemic Modality 
 
This section revisits frame element FORCE and casts a couple of questions: what 
triggers FORCE in Sweetser’s schematic picture? Is it triggered by itself or by an 
external motive? Who exerts it and who gets influenced? It seems that the previ-
ous approaches to EMs are not enough to deal with the raised questions, since 
other frame elements underlying FORCE such as ORIGIN of the FORCE, causation of 
the FORCE, motive of the causation and so forth are implicitly represented by a 
single force vector as shown in figure 1 above. This section aims to break it down 
into smaller pieces of frame elements and to model it in a more fine-grained sense.  
   Let us turn our attention to the parallelism between deontic and epistemic 
modals, which is shown in (6) and (7) above. Must in (6) indicates a deontic 
modal sense, whereas one in (7) does an EM sense. What is interesting is that the 
two kinds of modals share a common causal structure. In (6), an implicit cause in 
the given context or an implicit social authority which is inferred from the cause 
compels the addressee to do some action and in (7), an implicit evidence forces 
the speaker to reason and thus, to conclude that the addressee was home. Putting it 
differently, every EM requires that there be evidence, on which in most cases, the 
speaker’s reasoning is based, just as every deontic modality requires that there be 
cause, on which in most cases, the speaker’s authority is based. In this respect, we 
can see that in order to better grasp the causal event structure shared by deontic 
and epistemic modal senses, we need frame elements such as a CAUSE, a CAUSEE 
or a CAUSED EVENT, and CAUSE’s EFFECT or CAUSEE’s intention, which can be 
schematized in Figure 2.  
 
force
cause causee
a resulting event
 
Figure 2. Schematic Structure of Causality 
 
We need CAUSE, because with it, we could characterize motives of the FORCE, i.e. 
whether the FORCE is self-propelled or is triggered by an external factor. We need 
CAUSEE, because there must be a conceptual trajector that the FORCE is exerted on 
and thus, that travels through conceptual space. The exertion of the FORCE should 
be represented so that CAUSE and CAUSEE can be linked in the event structure.  
   With all the detailed frame elements, we can reanalyze the English modal 
examples that were shown in the previous sections. In the table, CAUSEE is a 
subject that force is exerted on and CAUSE is represented to be a FORCE EXERTER 
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in the frame of force dynamics.  
 
MAY (4) (5) 
Subject that FORCE is 
exerted on  
John the origo’s reasoning 
FORCE EXERTER cause of John’s going the speaker’s perception 
of evidence  
FORCE John’s will the speaker’s cognitive 
processes of inference 
BARRIER whatever reason in the 
given context, e.g., the 
speaker’s authority 
presupposed doubt, 
suspicion in the given 
context 
Table 1. Frame Elements of May 
 
As discussed previously regarding the parallel between deontic modal and epis-
temic modal, the mapping between frame elements of force dynamics and those 
of deontic/epistemic modal domains is coherent and systematic. The strong 
deontic/epistemic modal must can be reanalyzed as follows:  
 
MUST (6) (7)  
Subject that FORCE is exerted 
on 
you the origo’s reasoning 
FORCE EXERTER whatever cause in the 
given context 
the speaker’s perception 
of evidence 
FORCE causee’s will, the 
speaker’s authority 
the speaker’s cognitive 
processes of inference 
BARRIER none none 
Table 2. Frame Elements of Must 
 
In (6), notice that the FORCE can be either CAUSEE’s will or the speaker’s authority 
upon the context, since the action of coming home can be construed either to be 
executed by the subject (e.g., I must go home because I have lots of things to do) 
or to be forced by the speaker’s authority (e.g., I must go home because my mom 
told me to do so).  
For EMs, it is noted that the motivation of the FORCE (FORCE EXERTER) is the 
speaker’s perception of evidence. Without evidence, whatever its mode of access 
might be- direct, firsthand, indirect, hearsay, report, inference, or anything, EMs 
cannot exist. Some can challenge the claim by saying that EMs do not have to 
semantically encode the speaker’s perception of evidence, but as shown in Eng-
lish EM example (6), information of the speaker’s perception should be included 
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in the common ground of the interlocutor’s communicative acts.  
If the reanalysis of EMs with the detailed frame elements is on the right track, 
we can schematize the causal event structure of the modals based on the identical 
schematic picture that is already shown in Figure 2. The representations of each 
modality can be illustrated as below:  
 
Inference
Cause the participant
of the focal event
a resulting event
Inference
the origo’s reasoning
a resulting cognitive 
assessment
Evidence 
Perception
 
Figure 3. Deontic Modal   Figure 4. Epistemic Modal 
 
In Figure 3, the deontic modal is very similar to the causal event structure repre-
sented in Figure 2 except that CAUSEE is mapped onto the participant of the focal 
event in the sociophysical world domain. In Figure 4, however, it is worthwhile to 
take a look at how the frame elements are mapped onto those in EM domain. First, 
CAUSE is corresponding to the speaker’s perception of evidence. As mentioned 
earlier, without the implicit or explicit perception of evidence, EMs are not 
construed. CAUSEE corresponds to the origo’s reasoning on the focal event. Since 
the origo has perceived directly/indirectly relevant evidence, he/she begins to 
reason on the focal event in the given context and thus, reaches the stage where 
he/she can draw a conclusion. The FORCE exertion portion which is represented by 
the left arrow in the figure is bound to the origo’s inference. The degree of the 
strength of the origo’s inference is closely related to the semantics of the speak-
er’s assessment, which in turn, is closely related to EM meaning.  
The image schema of causal event structure of EM has significant implica-
tions. In fact, I propose the third view based on them regarding the debate on 
whether the two functional categories, EVs and EMs, are conflated or not. First, 
EVs are crucial part for our understanding of EMs: without the speaker’s percep-
tion of accessible evidence, the speaker would hardly employ EMs in utterance.  
Second, EM semantics is a natural consequence which can be given rise to in 
the causal event chain: if the origo perceives some evidence, it will naturally lead 
the origo to reason about its implication. This is not saying that there should be 
conventionalized ways that a certain kind of EM is paired with a certain kind of 
EV, but saying that since EVs and EMs are contiguously located in the causal 
event chain, it is natural that their functions overlap with each other.  
Third, the debate is an unfortunate consequence of concentrating only on each 
one of the functional categories within a certain theoretical assumption and of not 
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considering it within the causal event chain. I argue that the overall causal event 
chain provides a more comprehensive explication of meanings/ functions of EVs 
and EMs.  
In the following section, this paper will elaborate the view that utilizes the 
causal event structure in characterizing EVs and EMs and further in providing 
motivation for typological variance of encodability of EVs and/or EMs.  
 
3  The Third View: a Broader Picture 
 
Not taking either conflationist’s or non-conflationist’s view, this section proposes 
another view that EVs and EMs are, in fact, concepts that are dependent of each 
other. Thus, in order to characterize the functional categories, we need to consider 
either of the categories within the causal event structure that embeds EVs and 
EMs. The assumption that this view takes lies in the same vein as those who argue 
that modal judgment is based on evidence:  
 
“If one does not have any kind of evidence pertaining to a state of affairs, one cannot 
evaluate its probability” (Nuyts 2001). 
“Modal judgments are generally made based on some type of evidence, and one can often 
infer the speaker’s modal judgment from the type of information source indicated” (Roo-
ryck 2001). 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, the variety of encoding patterns 
of EVs and/or EMs in languages will not be a problematic issue in this view. They 
merely result from various language-specific ways of profiling EVs and/or EMs. 
In a nutshell, what this paper proposes can be shown as follows:  
 
cognitive processes 
of inference
Evidence
Perception
(Sensory Modality)
origo’s reasoning
on a focal event
evidentiality marking
epistemic modal marking
a resulting cognitive
assessment
 
Figure 5. Overlap between EVs and EMs 
 
As represented in Figure 5, EVs are licensed when the speaker tries to profile 
the portion of perception of evidence, for sure, and/or that of the origo’s cognitive 
Evidentials and Epistemic Modals in a Causal Event Structure 
 211 
processes of inference. In contrast, if EMs are in use, then the speaker tries to 
necessarily profile the portion of the origo’s cognitive processes of inference and 
the origo’s reasoning process, possibly with the speaker’s perception of evidence 
implied. Putting it differently, among the various events involved in EV/EM 
constructions such as the speaker’s evidence perception, the speaker’s reasoning 
etc., evidence perception and inference are conceptually packaged and profiled by 
prototypical EVs. In contrast, what EMs signal is that inference and the speaker’s 
reasoning or assessment of the evidence are profiled.  
Once we acknowledge that which portion of the causal event structure is pro-
filed and coded by linguistic cues of EVs and EMs varies upon languages, the 
various patterns of coding EVs-EMs in grammars can also be explained. In fact, 
within the causal structure, the three types of languages that have been discussed 
above (Korean, Nanti, and Imbabura Quechua) can be accounted for as shown 
below. First, the Korean example shows that EVs encode both the speaker’s 
perception of the evidence and the origo’s assessment, and it is represented in 
Figure 6. Semantics of EV and EM is not distinguished in the grammar and thus, 
the causal structure is profiled as a whole. The Nanti example where EV and EM 
are reflected separately into its grammar is represented in Figure 7. It shows that 
EVs only involve the speaker’s perception of the evidence and only a part of the 
origo’s belief is involved in the given context. Lastly, Figure 8 represents the case 
of Imbabura Quechua, where EV licensing condition is determined on context-by-
context basis. The flexibility of condition is represented in terms of potential 
overlaps in the figure.  
 
cognitive processes 
of inference
Evidence
Perception
(Sensory Modality)
origo’s reasoning
on a focal event
evidentiality marking/ epistemic modal marking
a resulting cognitive
assessment cognitive processes 
of inference
Evidence
Perception
(Sensory Modality)
origo’s reasoning
on a focal event
evidentiality marking
epistemic modal marking
a resulting cognitive
assessment
Figure 6. EV and EM in Korean Figure 7. EV and EM in Nanti
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cognitive processes 
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Evidence
Perception
(Sensory Modality)
origo’s reasoning
on a focal event
evidentiality marking
epistemic modal marking
a resulting cognitive
assessment
 
Figure 7. EV and EM in Imbabura Quechua 
 
The fundamental motivation underlying this view is actually endorsed by 
more than a few researchers (Rooryck 2001a, b, Izvorski 1998, Speas 2008, 
Mattewson et al. 2006, inter alia). They observed that modal judgments are 
generally made based on some type of evidence, and one can often infer the 
speaker’s modal judgment from the type of information source indicated (Speas 
2008: 951). Furthermore, Speas (2008: 953) noted that EVs do not express 
epistemic necessity or possibility, but they do express information about the 
modal base, from which possibility or necessity can be inferred in conjunction 
with contextual information (Speas 2008: 953). What they have observed con-
forms to this paper’s main claim: EVs and EMs are dependent of each other and 
without either of the two, the other cannot be properly construed.  
Thus, on the one hand, conflationists are right in that the two functional cate-
gories are entangled and thus, it is never clear at which point the boundary should 
be demarcated, as we have seen the overlap in Figure 5. On the other hand, non-
conflationists are also right from their perspective in that in some cases, EMs are 
not encoded, but rather be implicated in the context, represented as non-
overlapped portions in Figure 6. However, from our view, the grammatical 
separability is an epiphenomenon of construal of EMs and/or EVs in the causal 
event structure.  
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper explored the ongoing debate between so-called ‘conflationists’ and 
‘non-conflationists’ with regard to whether EVs and EMs are to be conflated or 
not. I claimed that as a third view, the debate is not a matter of separability of the 
two functional categories, but a matter of which portion of the causal event 
structure, which embeds both of the categories, is profiled, and becomes salient in 
the construal. In order to prove that the third view is plausible, this paper dis-
cussed that either of the approaches is not satisfactory and that the debate is an 
unfortunate consequence of theoretical assumption of clear-cut distinction be-
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tween semantics and pragmatics.  
In order to better grasp the functional categories, we need to consider the 
whole event structure that necessarily embeds both EVs and EMs. In order to 
provide motivated accounts of the interdependence of EVs and EMs as a concep-
tual ‘package,’ this study revisited Sweetser’s (1990) schematic structure of EM 
and reanalyzed the causal event chain that embeds both EVs and EMs in a more 
fine-grained sense. Based on the broad picture of event structure where EVs and 
EMs are embedded, this paper proposed a third view that we should consider the 
whole causal event structure in order to better grasp the interdependence, provid-
ing conceptual schematic model for EVs and EMs.  
The follow-up question should be an empirical question: which language pro-
files which portion of the overall causal structure, being influenced by its own 
way of entrenching and conventionalizing inferential patterns? This paper will 
leave the question to future research.  
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